University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural
Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

Summer 8-2021

IMPACTS OF CROP INSURANCE AND INTRA-SEASON HEDGING
ON LONG-RUN NET INCOME RISK
Kara Zimmerman
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, kzimmerman7@huskers.unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, and the Agricultural Economics Commons

Zimmerman, Kara, "IMPACTS OF CROP INSURANCE AND INTRA-SEASON HEDGING ON LONG-RUN NET
INCOME RISK" (2021). Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics. 67.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss/67

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses
in Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

1

IMPACTS OF CROP INSURANCE AND INTRA-SEASON HEDGING ON LONGRUN NET INCOME RISK

by
Kara A. Zimmerman
A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science
Major: Agricultural Economics

Under the Supervision of Professors Cory Walters and Kathleen Brooks

Lincoln, Nebraska

August, 2021

IMPACTS OF CROP INSURANCE AND INTRA-SEASON HEDGING ON LONGRUN NET INCOME RISK
Kara A Zimmerman, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2021
Advisors: Cory Walters and Kathleen Brooks
Each year producers must make risk management decisions early in the growing
season when many variables are unknown. In this thesis we create an empirical model
utilizing thirty years (1989-2018) of historical yield, cost, and daily price series data, to
determine the optimal risk management strategy of crop insurance and an intra-season
marketing plan that will both minimize net income risk and maximize average net
income. The empirical model is taken a step further to include an out-of-sample year in
order to test the robustness of empirical results to financially devastating events that have
never been seen. We test the results with two different out-of-sample models utilizing
two different yield and price scenarios. From the results, we find that the optimal
marketing plan changes based on the location and practice (irrigated vs. non-irrigated) as
well as the amount of hedging the producer decides to participate in before harvest. For
example, at low levels of hedging greater emphasis is put on the insurance contract
selected to affect financial outcomes, while at high levels of hedging, a plan that evenly
hedges grain throughout the growing season minimized risk and returned the highest
average net income.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
At the beginning of each year producers face many decisions about the upcoming
growing season. Some of these decisions can be made with more certainty than others.
Harvest yield and price are impossible to predict accurately but, they affect a key
component of the farms net income, their revenue which makes these decisions crucial.
Kenyon (2001) found that when producers were asked to estimate harvest prices in
January and February they on average overestimated what corn prices would be at by
$0.41.
Producers typically know their historical yields as well as historical spring and
harvest prices but as time goes on we tend to put more weight on recent events.
Furthermore, the path corn prices take from the spring to the fall are never the same.
Figure 1.1 shows that no two corn price paths were the same and all appear to behave
randomly in both where they start, the variability of price changes, and the path they took
from the beginning of February to the beginning of December.
There are two main types of risk management tools that can help producers
manage their price and yield risk. The first are publicly funded tools such as government
subsidized crop insurance that is overseen by the USDA Risk Management Agency
(RMA) and the second is privately funded tools such as strategic hedging on the futures
market. When a producer purchases crop insurance, they trade a premium cost for a
guarantee of a certain level of their yield or revenue. For example, if a producer
purchased a Yield Protection (YP) plan at the 70% coverage level, the producer pays a
premium and in return if their harvest yields are less than 70% of their 10-year Actual
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Production History (APH) they collect an indemnity payment equal to the number of
bushels short of their guaranteed level multiplied by the RMA’s projected price.

1

When a producer partakes in private risk management tools such as strategic
hedging on the futures market they are able to sell some of their grain for delivery in the
future. For example, a producer purchasing a December futures contract on May 15

th

agrees to deliver the specified number of bushels in December at the price on May 15

th

when the sale was made. This gives the producer more pricing opportunities rather than
taking the cash price at harvest.
Financial risk management decisions such as how much insurance to buy (if any)
must be made by March 15 , while strategic hedging decisions can be made any time
th

before, during or after the growing season. For the purpose of this study we restrict
hedging to only take place during the growing season. For hedging, a marketing plan
may be created before the growing season, providing the hedging strategy. The complex
decision environment resulting from unknown harvest yields and the price path between
spring and fall makes it difficult to determine the best crop insurance policy to
compliment the hedging strategy. Further, the relation between crop insurance and
hedging adds to the complex decision environment. Engaging in the wrong hedging
strategy along with the wrong crop insurance policy can put pressure on farm finances,
possibly leading to farm failure.
The two primary financial risk management tools we evaluate, crop insurance and
pre-harvest hedging are both designed to mitigate financial risk. However, like Wang

1

RMA’s projected price comes from the average of December corn futures prices in the month of
February.
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(2004) and Walters and Preston (2017) have shown, using the wrong combination of
these tools or each of them individually can inadvertently expose the producer to
additional net income risk over doing nothing. For example, pre-harvest hedging without
crop insurance can be financially devastating if a drought is experienced and yields drop
below what we have pre-sold and prices rise.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the role of intra-season hedging and crop
insurance policies on managing net income. To determine the optimal combination of
hedging and crop insurance we inspect the tradeoff between minimizing net income risk
and maximizing average net income realized from producing continuous corn. With
2

yield risk and the price-yield correlation changing across space we evaluate the role of
pre-harvest hedging and crop insurance on net income risk in two different counties in
Nebraska, Colfax and Scotts Bluff. Further, the farming practice, irrigated or nonirrigated, impacts the amount of yield risk and price-yield correlation. In both locations
we evaluate the role of both irrigated and non-irrigated production practices in
determining the optimal intra-season hedging strategy and crop insurance combination.
Our work builds upon the concepts identified in Brorsen (1998) where he
motivates the debate on whether pre-harvest marketing strategies can increase income.
Brorsen (1998) indicates primary view points in the debate over basing research in
marketing strategies on theory or empirical evidence. Here, we consider both empirical
evidence and an out-of-sample model as experience does not contain all possible
outcomes, indicating the need for a model that incorporates events yet to be realized. We

2

In a risky environment, producers’ must survive rare financially devastating events in order to stay in
business.
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include empirical evidence as this is what frames producers’ decision making and
influences future behavior. Our empirical model consists of thirty years of net income
outcomes from continuously producing corn. The out-of-sample model we create allows
for one more year of an event that has not yet been realized but is possible to be added to
our model. We will compare and contrast both models. The Covid-19 pandemic is a
recent example of an event that would not show up in the past 30 years, but could happen
at any time.
In the following section we will review literature concerning risk management
and the interaction of hedging and crop insurance. Next, we will motivate the empirical
model followed by the out-of-sample model. Finally, we will follow the out-of-sample
model with a discussion of results and conclusions.

5
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review
While work in the area of risk management using pre-harvest marketing is
plentiful, many findings have contradicted each other. Wisner et al (1998) and O’Brien
(1997) found that certain pre-harvest marketing tools such as options contracts could
increase expected return, while Zulauf and Irwin (1998) found no significant benefit from
pre-harvest marketing strategies compared to selling at the harvest cash price. Zulauf and
Irwin (1998) find that a producer with better access to information or a producer who has
high analytical ability may have a chance to capitalize on pre-harvest marketing strategies
but, a better focus would be on lowering their cost of production. All three of these
studies focused on analyzing pre-harvest hedging as a tool to increase your returns but,
pre-harvest hedging may also be used as a price risk management tool. An important
note to consider is what happens when contracts are oversold or in other terms a farmer
sells more bushels than they produce for some unforeseen reason. This is an example of
when engaging in pre-harvest marketing strategies can open a producer up to more net
income risk without the proper implementation of crop insurance.
Publicly funded crop insurance was first introduced with the passing of the
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938 but as Kramer (1983) explains it has changed
significantly since those first years with more crops, policies and premium subsidies
added. Barnett (2000) describes the history of crop insurance and how it has evolved into
what we know today. Many legislation changes in the 1980’s and ‘90’s including the
passage of The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 made more crops eligible and
introduced premium subsidies (Barnett 2000). The passage of crop insurance reforms in
1994, 1996 and 2000 increased the incentives for producers to participate (Barnett 2000).
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Risk management studies on the interaction of crop insurance with pre-harvest
hedging is not a new field of study. In a recent study, Walters and Preston (2017) found
that hedging without insurance was never on the efficient frontier, a result suggesting the
importance of crop insurance in managing net income risk. Coble et al. (2000) found that
the optimal levels of insurance and hedging were different based on where you were
located within the corn growing region. Specifically, Coble et al. (2000) compared a
county in Nebraska, Kansas, Illinois, and North Carolina. Optimal levels differed based
on yield variability for that area and the yield/price correlation, commonly referred to as
the natural hedge. Coble et al. (2000) also found that yield insurance and hedging
complement each other while revenue insurance tends to be a substitute for hedging.
Mahul (2003) found that revenue insurance and hedging were redundant in
complete markets but both came into the optimal strategy in incomplete markets. Wang
et al. (2004) found that with a revenue crop insurance policy, hedging is no longer needed
but when considering yield insurance, hedging was found to be a complement. Vyn
(2012) compared marketing strategies to the baseline of selling all crops at harvest and
found higher returns for pre-harvest marketing your crop and the strategies implementing
futures contracts had the greatest premiums over the baseline strategy.
While there have been many studies focused on this interaction of price and yield
risk management tools, many focus solely on historical realized events. The out-ofsample model developed in this thesis will incorporate two drastic yield and price
scenarios which will further our understanding of the role pre-harvest hedging and crop
insurance play on managing net income risk under financially devastating events.
Starting with the empirical model will ensure our results are based on what has actually
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happened and could happen again while the out-of-sample models incorporate events we
have never seen but are possible and must consider when making risk management
decisions.
CHAPTER 3: Empirical Model
Net Income
To evaluate the role of intra-season hedging and crop insurance we inspect net
income generated from producing corn with different intra-season hedging plans (further
referred to as marketing plans) and crop insurance contracts.
Our net income is defined as follows:
(1)

𝑁𝐼#,%,&,' = 𝑝*,#,%,& ∗ 𝑦*,#,%,&,' − 𝑏#,%,&,' − 𝑐 𝑦

#,%,&,'

+ [𝐼 𝑡, 𝑘, 𝑦, 𝑦 ∗ , 𝑝𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑧 −

𝑑 𝑡, 𝑝𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑧 ] + [𝑝9,#,%,& ∗ 𝑦9,#,%,&,' − ℎ𝑐 + 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘9,#,%,&,' ]
where NI represents net income and is a function of time t, location l, crop produced j,
and crop practice (irrigated or non-irrigated) w; 𝑝*,#,%,& represents harvest price; 𝑦*,#,%,&,'
represents bushels sold at harvest; 𝑏#,%,&,' represents fixed production costs; 𝑐 𝑦

#,%,&,'

represents costs dependent on yield; [𝐼 𝑡, 𝑘, 𝑦, 𝑦 ∗ , 𝑝𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑧 − 𝑑 𝑡, 𝑝𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑧 ] represents
insurance ( described in detail below) and [𝑝9,#,%,& ∗ 𝑦9,#,%,&,' − ℎ𝑐 + 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘9,#,%,&,' ]
represents contracting (described in detail below).
Crop insurance consists of an indemnity 𝐼 𝑡, 𝑘, 𝑦, 𝑦 ∗ , 𝑝𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑧 , which is a function
of the year t, crop insured k, harvest yield y, Actual Production History (APH) y , the plan
*

selected by the producer (Revenue Protection or Yield Protection) pl, crop practice
(irrigated or non-irrigated) w and the coverage level chosen by the producer z, as well as
a premium cost d(t,k,pl,w,z), which is a function of the year, crop insured, the plan
selected, crop practice and coverage level chosen.
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Selling bushels before harvest or strategic hedging adds in the last two terms of
price hedged (𝑝9,#,%,& ) under the marketing plan a times the amount of bushels hedged
(𝑦9,#,%,&,' ) under the marketing plan a minus the per bushel cost to initiate the hedge
(ℎ𝑐). 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘9,#,%,&,' under the marketing plan a represents the cost associated with
overselling, when hedged bushels are greater than production. There are two components
of buyback, first there is a per bushel fee on each bushel you must buyback because you
sold more than you produced and can’t deliver the grain and second there is a difference
in the hedged price and the harvest price that must be accounted for by the producer. We
limit buyback cost depending if the hedged price is higher or lower than the harvest price.
If a bushel buyback exists, and the price declines below the hedged price, we assume they
walk away from the contracts and no revenue will be generated from buying back at a
lower price. If the hedged price is lower than the harvest price, then the financial
3

difference must be paid for by the producer.
Crop Insurance Premiums
With thirty years in our evaluation we obtained data specific to each year for both
counties in Nebraska. Premium cost data per acre under each insurance plan, production
practice (irrigated or non-irrigated) and coverage level was obtained from the Summary
of Business reports published by RMA for the years 1989-2018. It is important to note
that in 2010 the RMA’s crop insurance was changed. What is now referred to as
Revenue Protection (RP) used to be called Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and what we
know as Yield Protection (YP) for corn today used to be referred to as APH Insurance.

3

Individual elevators determine how overselling price gains (hedged price higher than harvest cash price).
Gains are not always transferred back to the producer and we follow this approach. Our model can easily
be modified to provide gains back to the producer.
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The premise of the plans is the same so in calculating our Net Income distributions we
use RP and CRC essentially interchangeably as well as YP and APH.
Revenue protection with harvest price exclusion (RP-HPE) is not commonly sold
in Scotts Bluff County and in fact was only purchased in 2011 and 2012 for irrigated
acres based on the Summary of Business reports from RMA. In Colfax County there
were a few more years when RP-HPE was sold but it was still highly uncommon. Based
on the fact that this insurance option is rarely used, RP-HPE was not included in our
empirical or out-of-sample analysis.
During the early stages of crop insurance, plans offered and coverage levels
available changed frequently. Specifically, until 1997 only 75%, 65%, and 50% APH
insurance was available. Until 1999 the primary data available was for the 65% and 50%
coverage level and after 1999 all levels were purchased regularly besides the two highest,
85% and 80%. Before 1997 no revenue insurance (crop revenue coverage back then) was
available and in the first year only 70%, 65%, and 50% were sold. The next year 75%
was purchased and by 2000 all levels were sold except 60% and 55% which started being
purchased regularly in 2001. We decided to estimate what the CRC/RP and APH/YP
premiums would have cost at all coverage levels back to 1989 to show hypothetically
how they would have performed and with limited yield and price data this gave us a more
robust data set to work with.
To calculate accurate premium costs per acre for irrigated and non-irrigated corn
at each coverage level and insurance type we used historical Summary of Business
datasets from USDA RMA (1989-2018) that listed the amount of acres enrolled in each
county for every crop insurance contract option and the total producer premium paid for
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each insurance contract option. We utilized two datasets from RMA, one showing
combined data that was not separated by practice (irrigated vs. non-irrigated) and another
that separated the enrolled acres and producer premiums based on whether they were
producing irrigated or non-irrigated corn. The total producer premium for a given
insurance type and coverage level listed in the RMA dataset was divided by the number
of acres enrolled in that plan for the given year to give us an average cost per acre for
each insurance contract. We did not include data from acres enrolled with enterprise
units as this was not widely purchased and the cost differed significantly from the other
unit options offered by RMA. Unfortunately, the RMA insurance datasets that specified
irrigated verse non-irrigated acres sold were only available from 2002-2020 so the
combined dataset that did not differentiate between irrigated and non-irrigated corn was
used to calculate estimates for the missing premium costs from 1989-2001.
To begin we started with the dataset of specifying average insurance premium
cost per acre under the various insurance contracts that did not differentiate between the
cost of irrigated and non-irrigated corn. To calculate the premium costs that were missing
we:
1. Divided the premium for each revenue and yield insurance contract in a given
year by the premium cost for APH/YP at 70% coverage level. This returned a
ratio of each premium cost to the premium cost of APH/YP at 70% coverage.

4

a. Ex. In 2009 we found the premium cost per acre ratio for APH/YP at
the 65% coverage level by taking the average premium for APH/YP at

4

APH/YP at 70% coverage was used as the base rate for our calculations as the most commonly purchased
insurance on average from 1999-2018 in both locations.
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65% coverage divided by the premium cost per acre for APH/YP at the
70% coverage in 2009.
This process was repeated for every premium cost we had.
2. For missing premium costs per acre we calculated the previous 5-year average
of the ratios calculated in step 1 for the missing insurance contracts.
a. Ex. If the premium cost per acre was missing in 2012 for APH/YP at
the 65% coverage level we calculated the average of premium cost
ratios for APH/YP at 65% coverage from the years 2008,2009, 2010,
2011, 2012.
For years when there were no previous ratios we took the 5-year average of the
future years.
b. Ex. If the premium cost per acre was missing in 1990 for APH/YP at
the 65% coverage level we calculated the average of premium cost
ratios for APH/YP at 65% coverage from the years 1991, 1992, 1993,
1994, and 1995.
3. The 5-year averages of the premium cost ratios were then multiplied by the
premium cost for APH/YP at the 70% coverage level in that missing year and
the result was our estimated premium cost per acre.
a. Ex. To estimate the premium cost for APH/YP at 65% in 2012 the 5year average ratio calculated in 2 was multiplied by the premium cost
for APH/YP at 70% coverage in 2012.
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After the missing premium costs for the combined data were calculated these
costs were compared with the dataset that differentiated the premium costs based on the
practice, either irrigated or non-irrigated.
1. We divided the premium costs from the practice specific (irrigated vs. nonirrigated) dataset in each year by the corresponding premium cost from the
combined dataset for the same year to calculate ratios comparing the premium
cost from irrigated or non-irrigated corn to the combined premium cost.
a. Ex. To calculate the ratio for irrigated APH/YP at the 70% coverage
level in 2005 we divided the irrigated premium cost by the premium
cost from the combined data for APH/YP at the 70% coverage level.
This process was repeated for every premium cost we had.
2. For missing irrigated and non-irrigated premium costs per acre we calculated
the previous 5-year average of the ratios calculated in step 1 for the missing
insurance contracts.
a. Ex. If the premium cost per acre was missing in 2012 for non-irrigated
APH/YP at the 65% coverage level we calculated the average of
premium cost ratios relating the irrigated cost to the combined cost for
APH/YP at 65% coverage from the years 2008,2009, 2010, 2011,
2012.
For years prior to 2002 there were no previous ratios so we took the 5-year
average of the future years.
b. Ex. If the premium cost per acre was missing in 1990 for irrigated
APH/YP at the 65% coverage level we calculated the average of
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premium cost ratios relating irrigated premium costs to the combined
premium costs for irrigated APH/YP at 65% coverage from the years
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 that we had estimated.
3. The 5-year averages of the premium cost ratios relating the irrigated and nonirrigated premium costs to the combined premium costs were then multiplied
by the premium cost for the corresponding insurance contract premium cost
from the combined dataset in that missing year and the result was our
estimated premium cost per acre.
a. Ex. To estimate the premium cost for irrigated APH/YP at 65% in
2012 the 5-year average ratio calculated in step 2 was multiplied by
the premium cost for APH/YP at 70% coverage in 2012 from the
combined dataset.
Indemnity Payments
Crop insurance can have two effects on your net income. First, it is considered a
cost when paying your premiums which we have walked through above. The second
effect is realized in years where we see low prices, low yields or a combination of the
two. This second part is referred to as an indemnity payment. To calculate what
indemnity payment we would have received in every year we first went through and
calculated our guarantee. This will either be a guaranteed level of revenue or yield based
on the insurance contract selected.
The calculation for your insurance guarantees as specified in the RMA 2021
Handbook are,
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(2)

Projected RP Guarantee= Approved Yield * Coverage Level % * Spring
Projected Price

5

(3)

YP Guarantee= Approved Yield * Coverage Level %

where Approved Yield is your 10 year APH. To determine if an indemnity would have
been paid out we went through the next steps of calculating our realized revenues and
yields. Realized revenue is calculated by
(4)

Realized Revenue= Harvest Yield * Harvest Price

6

as listed in the 2021 RMA Handbook. We then compare this number to our guarantee
and if the Realized Revenue is less than the RP Guarantee (Eq. 2) the difference is paid
back to the producer in the form of an indemnity payment. When the harvest price is
higher than the spring price our RP Guarantee is recalculated using the same method
described in Eq. 2 except instead of the spring projected price you use the harvest price.
Again, we compare this new RP Guarantee to our realized revenue to determine if an
indemnity payment is triggered.
When calculating our yield indemnity payments we take the realized harvest yield
and compare this to our yield guarantee calculated in Eq. 3. If this number is less than
our yield guarantee (Eq. 3), then the difference in bushels between the guarantee and
realized yield is paid back at the spring projected price per bushel in the form of an
indemnity payment.

5

The spring projected price used by RMA is the average of all daily closing prices for December Futures in
the month of February (RMA Price Discovery Tool).
6
Harvest price used by RMA is the average of daily December futures closing prices in the month of
October (RMA Price Discovery Tool).
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Yield Data
Yield data to calculate our insurance indemnities and evaluate our plans was
obtained from NASS for the years 1979-2018 (the latest year published). We used
irrigated and non-irrigated corn data in the form of bushels per acre for Scotts Bluff and
Colfax counties in Nebraska later referred to as just Scotts Bluff and Colfax. When
county level data was unavailable crop reporting district data was used from the
northwest district of Nebraska where Scotts Bluff County is located and the east district
where Colfax County is located. We also incorporated plot level data from the KnorrHolden continuous corn plot operated by the University of Nebraska. The Knorr-Holden
plot is 38,000 sq. ft. of irrigated corn located north of the town of Scottsbluff in Scotts
Bluff County. Plot level yield data in the form of bushels per acre was available for the
years 1979-2018. Yield data from both Scotts Bluff and Colfax was trend adjusted and
used as our expected yield to base hedging limits off of in our models.
The two locations were selected based on the vast differences in growing
conditions and yield variability. For example, non-irrigated corn yields in Scotts Bluff,
which is located in western Nebraska, ranged from a minimum of 10.6 bushels an acre in
2012 to a maximum of 79.7 bushels an acre in 2018 with an average of 50.46 bushels an
acre over the years 1989-2018 (USDA NASS). In Colfax however non-irrigated corn
yields ranged from a minimum of 49 bushels an acre in 2012 to the maximum of 195.8 in
2015 bushels an acre with an average of 128.49 over the years 1989-2018 (USDA
NASS).
Irrigated corn yields were higher across both growing regions and in Scotts Bluff
we had the availability of Knorr-Holden plot level data as well as county level yields.
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Irrigated corn yields at the county level in Scotts Bluff ranged from a minimum of 91
bushels an acre in 1993 to a maximum of 186.6 bushels an acre in 2017 with an average
of 148 bushels an acre over the years 1989-2018 (USDA NASS). Knorr-Holden irrigated
corn yields in Scotts Bluff ranged from a minimum of 15 bushels an acre in 2000 when
an adverse weather event greatly impacted yields to a maximum of 286.5 bushels an acre
in 2015 with an average of 175.5 bushels an acre over the years of 1989-2018 (UNL).
On the other end of the state irrigated corn yields in Colfax ranged from a minimum of
112 bushels an acre in 1993 to a maximum of 216.5 bushels an acre in 2015 with an
average of 173.3 bushels an acre (USDA NASS).
Across space the price/yield correlation which is commonly referred to as the
“natural hedge”, changes. This correlation is the relationship between price and yield
which can affect how our strategic hedging decisions interact with the crop insurance
contract selected by the producer. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for
each location and practice using the 30 years of December futures price data from
Barchart as well as the NASS yield data and are listed below in Table 3.1.
Based on our 30 years of yield and price data we see a slightly stronger negative
correlation between prices and yields for the non-irrigated acres in Scotts Bluff compared
to the non-irrigated yields in Colfax. Under irrigated acres, there is a stronger negative
correlation for Colfax than Scotts Bluff at the county level, while at the plot level in
Scotts Bluff the correlation is positive. All coefficients calculated for these locations are
weak.
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Production Costs
The final costs that were incorporated into our net income distributions were
typical production costs i.e, fertilizer, seed, pesticide and more. These costs came from
crop budgets published by the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. Before 2009, published
crop budgets were limited and the years 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000,
2002, 2003 and 2005-2008 were missing. Costs were estimated for the missing years
using a linear increase from the closest year before and after the missing year of available
costs data.
Marketing Plans
With all of our data in place the next step was to incorporate strategic intra-season
hedging in the form of marketing plans into our empirical model. Before we could
implement intra-season hedging into our model we had to first come up with sound
marketing plans. We wanted them to be simple while also realistic to what producers
actually use, and we wanted them to remove the emotion that can often pop up when
marketing your grain. The following seven marketing plans are what we decided on
because they used simple technical indicators that people with even little trading
experience could follow.
In each of the following marketing plans we assume all crops are sold during the
growing season, marketing plans are implemented on March 1 with daily December
st

future prices and any grain produced above what we pre-sell is sold at harvest. Oversold
bushels that are not produced are bought back during harvest at the cash price if prices
increase. If price decreases the farmer walks away from the contract. Selling and buying
back your hedged bushels each come with a cost per bushel.
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The following are explanations of the original marketing plans tested against
historical price and cost data. Out of these marketing plans 4 of the 7 are based off of
technical indicators with another based solely on time and the first two based on whether
the price was higher or lower than the crop insurance projected price:
•

Price Decline Trigger-This marketing plan is based on marketing as your price is
dropping below the starting price. We set up intervals that are a percentage of the
initial price and when the price drops into one of these intervals we market grain.
The percent level for each interval can be altered but for the purpose of our
analysis we hold this at 2.5% so that marketing is triggered when price falls into
the 97.5-100% of the closing price on the last trading day of February, 95-97.5%,
92.5-95% and so forth. This marketing plan is setup so that if a price stays in a
trigger zone for more than one day we wait our set time to sell again. For
example, if price moves into an interval on marketing day 1 and stays there for 12
days, we will not sell each day but rather on day 1 and day 11. However if price
declines into one interval on marketing day 1 and then on marketing day 2 price
drops even further into another interval, marketing is triggered on both days. We
set it up as being triggered strictly when prices decline. It is when prices start to
decline that we worry that this could be a long-term trend and they could continue
to decline so we want to sell some of our grain. This marketing plan protects
against prices falling farther so that we don’t end up selling all of our grain at a
low price at harvest.

•

Price Increase Trigger- This marketing plan is similar to the “Price Decline
Trigger” marketing plan but is set up with the idea that we want to take advantage
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of high price rallies. We only pre-sell when price goes up because we like the
idea of selling grain at higher prices through the growing season and we think
these prices won’t continue through till harvest. In this case we would be hoping
if the price starts to drop that we might be compensated in these low prices with a
crop insurance indemnity payment so we just want to take advantage of high
prices so we don’t “leave money on the table”.
•

Time Approach- This marketing plan is a straightforward way to evenly spread
the number of bushels sold before harvest out across the entire growing season
regardless of what prices are doing. This is the simplest marketing plan tested
and it is more of a benchmark to see if following any technical indicators really
does help you out or if you are just as well off taking a simple wait X amount of
days and market approach. We set the wait time as 10 trading days or two weeks.
10 trading days was chosen because it was more frequent than marketing once a
month but it wasn’t as frequent as weekly marketing.
The last four marketing plans rely on the technical indicator of changes in the

moving average. We focus on moving averages (MA) and the days counted are only
trading days (Monday-Friday) so that a 5-Day MA is a one week moving average, a 10Day is two weeks, and a 20-Day is four weeks.
•

5-Day MA Drops Below 10-Day- This marketing plan is similar to our thinking
behind the price decline trigger. We are using moving averages here instead of
just the price because they aren’t quite as responsive as just the daily price and the
initial price. A price swing one day that doesn’t carry through and quickly returns
to the average won’t necessarily trigger marketing so we think of it as being not
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as “jumpy” to price changes. When the 5-Day MA drops below the 10-day we
believe prices are heading down so we market because we think this is actually a
trend down in price, not a one day spoof and we don’t want to end up selling all
of our grain at low prices.
•

5-Day MA Rises Above 10-Day- This approach is more of the thinking behind
our Price Increase Trigger but again uses moving averages so it doesn’t react to
just one day changes. When our shorter term moving average moves above our
longer term we think prices are on the trend up so we want to take advantage of
these higher prices.

•

If Price < the 20-DAY MA- This approach uses a longer moving average and is
worried about prices trending lower than the average of the last four weeks of
trading. This approach would be triggered a little easier than the two marketing
plans listed above but again we are only worried about the price dropping below
the average so that we sell right when it drops below so we don’t get stuck selling
at an even lower price if it drops farther.

•

If Price > the 20-DAY MA- This approach is the opposite of the one above. It
looks at the price compared to the last four week average and triggers us to
market when the price rises above the average. The thought process behind this
was that we wanted to sell our grain at high prices so if the price crosses above
the 20-Day MA it may be showing a trend of prices moving up and we want to
start taking advantage of this to sell some of our grain at prices higher than we
have seen in the last four weeks.
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•

Harvest Sale- This approach is a producer who sells every produced bushel at the
harvest price and does not hedge any grain throughout the growing season. This
approach is used as a benchmark marketing plan for comparison with the plans
that hedge grain throughout the growing season.

•

Harvest Sale and No Insurance-Under the “Harvest Sale and No Insurance”
marketing plan the producer is selling all of their produced bushels at the harvest
price and they are not purchasing any form of crop insurance. Including this
marketing plan in the analysis shows us the value of purchasing crop insurance in
a given year.
Every marketing plan except “Harvest Sale and No Insurance” is ran with yield

and revenue insurance at 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage
level. The empirical model was ran with the insurance coverage level of 0% or no
insurance paired with each marketing plan that hedges grain throughout the growing
season. The results from including no insurance as an option did not differ dramatically
in terms of how the marketing plans performed from the results at the 50% coverage level
as 50% coverage is low and indemnities are rarely triggered. Specifically, insurance
indemnities at the 50% coverage level were triggered in one year for non-irrigated corn in
Colfax, three years under the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot and Scotts Bluff non-irrigated
corn and they were never triggered for Colfax irrigated corn or Scotts Bluff irrigated
corn.
All seven of these intra-season marketing plans were ran with historical price data
for daily December corn futures from 1989-2018 from Barchart. A separate average preharvest and harvest basis was incorporated for both Scotts Bluff and Colfax (Johnson and
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Walters 2014). With all of the daily price data and marketing plans in place we ran our
marketing plans against historical price paths to see how they perform in terms of
maximum, minimum, and average price received and the amount of APH they hedge
before harvest. Finally, crop budget costs and insurance data was added to the model to
run Eq. 1 and determine the net income results under the different marketing plans and
insurance contracts.
When producing crops there are a number of choice variables that each producer
decides based on their own environment which can alter your final net income. These
variables include the number of acres in production of each crop, the number of bushels
sold on a day when marketing is triggered, the amount of your APH you allow your
marketing plans to pre-sell, how often you engage in pre-harvest marketing and the
insurance contract and coverage level you purchase. For the basis of our analysis we
decided to hold the number of acres in production constant at 1,500 acres, the number of
bushels sold when marketing is triggered at 15,000 bushels and the wait time to 10
trading days or two weeks when a marketing plan incorporates some sort of set wait time.
We eventually let the amount of APH allowed to be pre-sold differ, as well as the
insurance contract so we can see how these two variables affect our final net income.
To begin comparing how dynamic our marketing plans are we will set a high limit on the
amount of our APH we allow the marketing plans to pre-sell. The maximum limit was
set at 100% to allow the biggest opportunity for the marketing plans to differ in terms of
the maximum and minimum price each marketing plan returns and amount of APH they
hedge before harvest. Hedging 100% of your APH is a higher value than most producers
would choose because it is viewed as highly risky but that is the maximum limit and may
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not be met in all years. Setting the hedging limit this high allows us to identify how
powerful our grain marketing plans are in determining our financial outcomes. First, we
will compare the marketing plans in terms of average price received in each year. After
seeing how the marketing plans compared in terms of average price received we will take
our historical evaluation one step further to compare the net income’s resulting from each
of these marketing plans under each insurance contract in all 30 years of yield data. Then
we will rank the marketing plans in terms of which marketing plan gave us the highest
average net income across all thirty years and also highest minimum net income or in
other terms the lowest risk. Finally, we will allow the APH to differ to compare what
level of strategic hedging gives us the greatest expected income with the lowest risk.
Table 3.1 Pearson Harvest Price/Yield Correlation Coefficients
Colfax

Scotts Bluff

Non-Irrigated

Irrigated

Non-Irrigated

Irrigated

-0.27

-0.30

-0.29

-0.05

Knorr-Holden
Plot
0.30

CHAPTER 4: Out-of-sample Model
With a strong understanding of how crop insurance and strategic hedging have
interacted in the past in terms of lowering our net income risk and maximizing our
average net income we turn to the future where any combination of price and yield is
possible. With no ability to predict what will happen in five years let alone this very
growing season we implement drastic yield and price scenarios into our empirical model
to see how this alters our previous results of the best combination of crop insurance and
strategic hedging strategy. If our results from the empirical model are in fact the best risk
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management strategy for a financially devastating year then adding in one worse year
should not alter our optimal combination. If adding in this out-of-sample year changes
our optimal solution we know that our empirical results were biased to the thirty years of
available data we had and were not in fact the best solution during a financially
devastating year.
In each location we run the same model incorporated in our empirical model but
include one more year in the future, an out-of-sample year. In our out-of-sample year we
choose the yield and daily price series to give us a drastic year to incorporate into our
analysis. We test each location and practice in two ways. First, we choose an out-ofsample year to have low yields and high prices. Next, we choose the out-of-sample year
to have low yields and low prices. The out-of-sample analysis is intended to stress test
the empirical results and show whether the empirical results are robust to rare, financially
devastating events. We include two low revenue events. The first low revenue event
could be thought of as a wide spread drought. When the drought is experienced, the
producer experiences a low yield as well as many producers and the fall price rises
substantially higher than spring. The second low revenue event is represented through a
low yield and low price event. One can conceptualize the low yield low price event to be
generated from experiencing a hail/wind event on the farm along with a year where prices
dropped from spring to fall. For the purpose of this model yields are unknown until
harvest.
To calculate our extremely low yield for each location we first de-trended our
yield data. Next, we calculated each yields deviation from the trend. After finding the
worst deviation from the trend we added half of the difference between the absolute value
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of the deviation and one to the worst deviation and multiplied this value by our expected
yield to get our worst yield. For example, if the worst yield deviation was 0.33 then we
would take half of the remaining value (1-.33=.66/2=.33) and this would be added to our
worst deviation and then multiplied by our expected yield for that year.
The low yields we calculated for each location are as follows (bushels per acre):
•

Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated (5.50)

•

Scotts Bluff Irrigated (58.29)

•

Knorr-Holden Irrigated Plot (10.21)

•

Colfax Non-Irrigated (27.28)

•

Colfax Irrigated (78.50)

For our price series in our theoretical year we ran these low yields against two prices
series. Both started out at average levels but one ended at very high prices and the other
ended at very low prices. For the high price year we choose 2012 and for the low price
year 2004 was chosen.
The same marketing plans and cost data used in our empirical model was ran with
this new out-of-sample year to test our empirical results. We describe the results from
our out-of-sample models similarly to the way we presented our empirical model. For
the purpose of this comparison the choice variables from the empirical analysis will be
held the same (1,500 acres, 100% APH allowed to be sold before harvest, 10 day wait
when time is included in the marketing plan, 15,000 bushels sold on a marketing day).
While 100% of APH is a higher level of hedging than producers typically engage in
setting the limit this high allows us to differentiate financial outcomes from participating
in strategic hedging. To begin we hold the choice variables constant and analyze which
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marketing plan and insurance contract combination maximized average net income across
all thirty-one years (1989-2018 + out-of-sample year) while simultaneously minimizing
our net income risk and compare these results to the empirical model. We then will allow
the amount of hedging to differ and compare at low, medium, and high levels of hedging
how the results change.
CHAPTER 5: Results
Empirical Model
To see how adaptive to price changes the marketing plans were we can look at an
overall summary of every marketing plan. Table 5.1 describes how the amount of APH
hedged by the marketing plans differed by location and practice (irrigated vs. nonirrigated). Note that the maximum bushels marketed can be varied. For comparison
purposes, we set the limit at 100% of the APH, a limit higher than a typical producer
would choose. This high limit provides greater opportunity for the marketing plans that
sell throughout the growing season to differentiate themselves from the two harvest sale
options. For example, the number of bushels sold in a marketing year under the price
decline marketing strategy in Knorr-Holden plot data ranged from a max of 100% (which
we set as the limit) to zero with an average of 83%. The wide range in marketed bushels
reflects the influence of the marketing strategy triggering sales given the evolution of
prices within the marketing year. Zero marketing bushels in the price decline marketing
strategy indicates prices did not drop enough to trigger a sale throughout the marketing
period. Marketing plans performed differently as they adapted to the path price observed.
Marketing plans did not perform the same across each location and practice. From Table
5.1 we see the “Price Decline” and “Price Incline” marketing plans in each location had
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years when no bushels were hedged before harvest and instead were all marketed at the
harvest price. There were also years in those same two marketing plans as well as the
“Time” marketing plan when all of the APH was hedged before harvest. Scotts Bluff
non-irrigated corn had the largest averages of APH pre-hedged under each marketing
plan while Colfax irrigated corn had the smallest averages. The four marketing plans,
which are all based on moving averages, always hedged at least 22% of APH before
harvest.
With plans following the same price path in both counties and for both irrigated
and non-irrigated production, triggered marketing days will be the same. APH for Scotts
Bluff non-irrigated yields were 100 bushels an acre less than Colfax irrigated yields so
with the number of bushels hedged being held constant across both locations and
practices (irrigated vs. non-irrigated) one day of marketing hedges a larger percent of the
Scotts Bluff non-irrigated yields than the Colfax irrigated yields. While the percent of
APH sold appears to be much less the actual number of bushels hedged is not.
While the limit of 100% of APH does not change, from year to year the APH changes,
impacting the number of bushels allowed to be hedged. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below
describe how APH evolves over time for Scotts Bluff and Colfax, respectively. Scotts
Bluff non-irrigated production APH has remained relatively steady, while irrigated
production and Knorr-Holden plot level shows a positive trend. For Colfax, Figure 5.2,
shows a positive trend for both irrigated and non-irrigated production practices.
Table 5.2 compares each marketing plan’s outcomes based on minimum,
maximum and average price received including the cost of hedging for each location and
practice, irrigated or non-irrigated. Selling all your production at harvest or “Harvest
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Sale” had the highest average price and the lowest average price received in each location
and practice. The lowest price for the “Harvest Sale” marketing plan was $0.14 less than
the next lowest marketing plan, “If Price > the 20-Day MA” in Colfax irrigated acres.
The highest price of $7.37 for the “Harvest Sale” marketing plan was $0.24 higher than
the next highest marketing plan which was the “Price Incline” marketing plan in the
Knorr-Holden irrigated acres. Across each location and practice there is a clear pattern of
which years returned the highest prices and which years returned the lowest prices. The
highest average prices received were in the years 2012 and 2011 under every marketing
plan, location, and practice. The lowest prices consistently came from 1999, 2000, 2001,
and 2002 for all of the marketing plans except the two that are triggered as price moves
around the 20-Day MA which returned the lowest price in 2005 at each location and
practice.
Fig. 5.3 is an example of the daily December corn future price path for the years
1990 and 1991. As you can see neither of the price paths look the same because both sets
of prices evolved with different conditions.
Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 are an example of the “Price Incline” marketing plan for
Scotts Bluff non-irrigated corn in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Recall that in the “Price
Incline” marketing plan prices had to rise 2.5 percent above the initial price to trigger
hedging. In 1990 hedging was triggered early in the growing season and stopped around
the end of June as prices started to decline. While in 1991 prices did not rise enough to
trigger any hedging (Fig. 5.4).
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Net Income
Combining our yield data with our marketing plans allowed us to evaluate net
income generated from each marketing plan across the various crop insurance contracts.
Figures 5.6-5.10 are examples of how each marketing plan compared in terms of net
income generated per acre when yield insurance at the 70% coverage level was purchased
from 1989-2018 in both locations and under both irrigated and non-irrigated corn
production. While net income paths were ran under both APH/YP and CRC/RP
insurance at each coverage level the shapes of the graphs were similar across each
insurance contract so for comparison purposes we will stick with one insurance contract
of APH/YP at the 70% coverage level as this on average had the most acres enrolled for
both irrigated and non-irrigated production in both locations.

7

Fig. 5.6 visualizes how crucial buying insurance can be in certain years for nonirrigated corn in Colfax. In Fig. 5.6 the net income paths from each marketing plan start
out close and then in 2012 (a drought) the value of insurance comes into play as the dark
gray line representing no hedging and no insurance drops well below the rest of the
marketing plans (including the marketing plan of no hedging and purchasing insurance)
to a net income of negative $37.43 an acre. As a producer in Colfax growing nonirrigated corn if you hadn’t purchased insurance you would have been doing about as
well as your neighbor who purchased insurance by the difference of the yearly premium
until 2012. In 2012 non-irrigated corn producers who purchased yield protection
insurance at the 70% coverage level would have enjoyed positive net income per acre of
$260.75 while not buying insurance lost $37.43 an acre.

7

Graphs of net income paths under other insurance contracts are available upon request from the author.
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Figure 5.7 compares the net incomes generated under each marketing plan when
producing irrigated corn in Colfax. When comparing Fig. 5.6 and 5.7 the value of
irrigation in managing part of your risk is clear. For 2012, irrigated production, in the
same county, did not experience the same variability in net income as non-irrigated
production. For irrigated production in 2012, the “Price Decline” marketing plan returned
the lowest net income of $131.45 per acre.
In Scotts Bluff the net incomes generated from irrigated and non-irrigated corn
production show a different relationship between insurance and the marketing plans. In
figures 5.8 and 5.10 insurance plays a role in increasing your net income under both
irrigated corn production at the plot level and non-irrigated corn production at the county
level with years when the “Harvest Sale and No Insurance” (dark grey line) drops below
the other marketing plans indicating less net income per acre generated under that
marketing plan.
In Fig. 5.8 the harvest sale and no insurance (dark grey line) separates from the
rest of the marketing plans on the downward side (lower net income) in multiple years,
specifically there are large differences in 2002 and 2012. In 2012 buying insurance and
not participating in any hedging (maroon line), returned $123.54 per acre more in net
income than selling everything produced at harvest. In 2012 every marketing plan
representing participating in strategic hedging is above the marketing plan of not hedging
before harvest showing us hedging also increased you net income per acre above what
you would have received from selling everything at harvest. These results suggest that
the combination of marketing plan and crop insurance influences net income.
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Buying yield insurance was not a large benefit when looking at irrigated county
level yields as the dark grey line representing “Harvest Sale and No Insurance” never
dropped below the other marketing plans in Fig. 5.9. In Fig. 5.9 none of the marketing
plans drop lower from the rest and all marketing plans follow the same shape. In Fig.
5.10, which is also irrigated corn production but at the plot level, insurance does add a
value to the net income. Specifically, in the year 2000, the net income from selling all of
your produced crop at harvest and buying no insurance falls to negative $312.30 an acre
while the rest of the marketing plans are all above negative $200.00 an acre. That means
the simple act of purchasing insurance made you $100.00 an acre better off in net
income.
To inspect the influence of grain marketing plans and crop insurance we inspect
the reward, defined as the average net income per acre and risk, defined as the minimum
net income per acre observed across all years. We present portfolios representing each
marketing plan across different locations, practices (irrigated or non-irrigated), levels of
maximum hedging, coverage levels and insurance types (yield and revenue). The riskreward tradeoff for Colfax, non-irrigated, max hedging of 100% of APH is presented in
5.11. We convert the risk-reward to percentage of production costs. This normalizes our
net incomes to observed production costs through the thirty years. A value equal to
100% means we have a net income equal to 0 while values higher than 100% correspond
to a positive net income and a value less than 100% signals negative net income.
We begin inspecting the risk-reward from Colfax irrigated and non-irrigated
production with a maximum hedging level of APH set at 100%. Results indicate for
non-irrigated corn in Colfax all types of pre-harvest marketing plans increase average net
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income and decrease your risk, Fig. 5.11. Of the marketing plans, the “Time” marketing
plan with yield insurance at the 50% coverage level returned the least risk option (lowest
revenue per acre) while the “Price Incline” marketing plan with revenue insurance at the
50% coverage level resulted in the highest average net income option.
Fig. 5.12 depicts the risk-reward tradeoff for irrigated production in Colfax with a
maximum hedging level of APH set at 100%. When producing irrigated corn in Colfax
utilizing the “Harvest Sale” marketing plan puts you at the most risk and a lower average
net income per acre than not participating in hedging or purchasing insurance. This is
because insurance indemnities were only collected at the highest coverage levels of yield
and revenue insurance. Under low coverage levels premiums were paid each year and no
indemnities were ever collected. Similar to the non-irrigated results utilizing the “Price
Incline” marketing plan returned higher average net income than “Time” however, the
“Time” marketing plan provides lower risk. Only two marketing plans, “Time” and
“Price Incline” returned average net incomes that were positive when paired with low
coverage levels of revenue and yield insurance.
The risk-reward tradeoff with a hedging limit of 100% of our APH for Scotts
Bluff irrigated and non-irrigated and the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot data can be found in
figures 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15, respectively. As seen in all three figures, the “Time”
marketing plan provided the lowest level of risk for non-irrigated and irrigated production
at the county and plot levels. However, for the non-irrigated production it was with 85%
coverage level of yield insurance and for irrigated production it was with the 50%
coverage level of yield insurance. Results from the non-irrigated county level yields in
Scotts Bluff show the “Time” marketing plan returned the highest average net income,
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Fig. 5.13. The difference between irrigated and non-irrigated results is the “Price
Incline” marketing plan does not return a higher average net income or less risk under
any insurance contract. Fig. 5.13 shows that “Harvest Sale” and “Harvest Sale and No
Insurance” give you the lowest average net income and most risk making those marketing
plans the worst option.
The largest decrease in risk when using the “Time” marketing plan occurs under
irrigated production at the county level. The “Price Incline” marketing plan returned
similar average net incomes as the “Time” marketing plan for irrigated acres at the
county level but with more risk, Fig. 5.14. At the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot level
“Harvest Sale and No Insurance” (red dot) exposed the farm to the most risk and returned
close to the lowest average net income, Fig. 5.15. The “Time” marketing plan returned
the highest average net income, more than “Price Incline” and was also less risky than the
“Price Incline” marketing plan. However, the marketing plans triggered when price
moves around the 20-Day moving average had similar risk levels to “Time” but at lower
average net incomes, Fig. 5.15.
Different Levels of Hedging
Finally, we analyze the tradeoff between the lowest net income and average net
income at different levels of hedging before harvest. All other choice variables were kept
at the same levels as the previous analysis except the amount of APH we allow the
marketing plans to sell before harvest. For the purpose of these results we show three
levels of hedging, Low (10% of APH), Medium (50% of APH), and High (100% of
APH). Graphs for Colfax non-irrigated production will be displayed within the text with
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the results from irrigated production in Colfax as well as all results from Scotts Bluff
available in the Appendix of this thesis.
Figures 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 show how the marketing plans behaved at different
levels of hedging. Results from non-irrigated corn production in Colfax Nebraska
indicate at low levels of hedging the insurance contract selected plays a bigger role in
differentiating financial outcomes than the marketing plans. From Fig. 5.16 purchasing
yield insurance at the 75% coverage level resulted in the least risk under low levels of
hedging for every marketing plan that hedges grain before harvest. However, for medium
levels of hedging (Fig. 5.17) the least risk comes from yield insurance at the 85%
coverage level and the “Price Incline” marketing plan resulted in the highest average net
income across all crop insurance policies at medium levels of hedging. Under high levels
of hedging in Fig. 5.18 the “Time” marketing plan and “Price Incline” marketing plan
returned similar average net incomes but the “Time” marketing plan provided lower risk.
The “Time” marketing plan under high levels of hedging resulted in the highest average
net income and the lowest risk was achieved when purchasing yield protection at the
50%, 55%, and 60% coverage levels as well as revenue insurance at the 50% coverage
level.
To see how the different levels of hedging compared with one another we plot all
three levels in one graph, Fig. 5.19. When comparing the different levels of hedging
under the non-irrigated practice in Colfax the “Time” marketing plan under high levels of
hedging resulted in the highest average net income and lowest risk. The “Harvest Sale
and No Insurance” marketing plan resulted in the high risk and average to low levels of
average net income.
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Results from irrigated corn production in Colfax, which are shown in the
appendix, indicate under low levels of hedging the marketing plans behaved similar in
terms of average net income however, the “Time” marketing plan had the lowest risk and
highest reward. The insurance contracts with the least risk and highest average net
income were lower coverage levels. Specifically, the insurance contracts providing the
highest net income and lowest risk were from yield insurance at lower coverage levels
(50%, 55%, and 60%) and revenue insurance at the 50% coverage level.
At medium levels of hedging the “Price Incline” marketing plan coupled with low
coverage levels of yield and revenue insurance returned the highest average net income.
However, “Price Incline” paired with high coverage levels of yield insurance resulted in
the least risk with lower average net incomes. At high levels of hedging the “Time”
marketing plan under every insurance contract had the lowest risk but only had positive
average net incomes when paired with low coverage levels of yield and revenue
insurance. The “Price Incline” marketing plan had more risk but higher average net
incomes than the “Time” marketing plan. Results from comparing all three levels of
hedging under irrigated corn production in Colfax indicate high levels of hedging and
time marketing plan resulted in the highest average net income and lowest risk.
Results from non-irrigated corn production in Scotts Bluff (listed in the
Appendix) indicate at the lowest levels of hedging, yield insurance at 80% or revenue
insurance at 75% provides the lowest risk and highest average net income. However, at
medium levels of hedging the optimal insurance contract changes to yield protection at
the 85% coverage level and under high levels of hedging the marketing plan becomes the
differentiating factor to obtaining higher average net incomes and lower risk. At high
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levels of hedging the “Time” marketing plan returned the highest average net income and
lowest risk when paired with every insurance contract.
When comparing all levels of hedging together when producing non-irrigated
corn in Scotts Bluff we found higher levels of hedging resulted in higher average net
incomes and lower risk. However, a producer not purchasing crop insurance or
participating in strategic hedging puts them in the highest risk.
In Scotts Bluff at low levels of hedging under irrigated corn production no
marketing plan provided the best option (graphs available in the Appendix). The
insurance contract purchased differentiated the outcomes with yield protection at the 80%
and 85% coverage level or revenue protection at 75% providing the least risk under
multiple marketing plans. Under medium levels of hedging the “Time” marketing plan
with high coverage level of yield protection resulted in the least risk while the highest
average net income was achieved under the “Price Incline” marketing plan with yield or
revenue protection at the lowest coverage levels. Under high levels of hedging the
“Time” marketing plan provided the least risk and resulted in similar average net incomes
to the “Price Incline” marketing plan. The highest average net income within the “Time”
marketing plan was achieved when purchasing yield protection at a low coverage level.
Comparing all of the hedging levels together under irrigated corn production in
Scotts Bluff we see that high levels of hedging with the “Time” marketing plan resulted
in the lowest risk and high average net incomes. Both low and medium levels hedging
resulted in similar levels of risk and average net incomes.
Results from the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot level in Scotts Bluff (listed in the
appendix) show us when participating in low levels of hedging the biggest difference in
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results came from different insurance contracts with revenue protection at 75% coverage
level returning the highest average net income and least risk. When moving to higher
levels of hedging the marketing plans start to play a bigger role in differentiating the
financial outcomes. At medium levels of hedging the “Price Incline” marketing plan
returned the highest average net incomes while purchasing yield protection at high
coverage levels provided the lowest risk. At high levels of hedging the “Time”
marketing plan under all insurance contract options provided the highest average net
income and least risk.
Under different levels of hedging at the plot level for irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff
we see the “Time” marketing plan with high levels of hedging resulted in the least risk
and highest average net income. Under all levels of hedging when producing irrigated
corn at the Knorr-Holden plot we find that purchasing revenue protection at the 85%
level resulted in the lowest average net incomes compared to other insurance contracts.
Medium and high levels of hedging resulted in similar risk levels however higher levels
of hedging resulted in higher average net incomes.
Out-of-sample Model
Net Income (Low Yield/High Price)
First, we will look at the out-of-sample results when a year with a low yield and
high price path is included. The choice variables are set to the same limits as the
empirical analysis for both Scotts Bluff and Colfax irrigated and non-irrigated
production. Graphs showing the results from Colfax non-irrigated yields will be shown
in the results with the other location and practice (irrigated vs. non-irrigated) graphics
shown in the Appendix. Figure 5.20 displays results from Colfax non-irrigated corn
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production when the hedging limit is set at 100% of APH. Results including the first outof-sample year of a low yield and high price did not change from the empirical results
with the least risk achieved under the “Time” marketing plan while the “Price Incline”
marketing plan returned a higher average net income but with more risk. Under the
“Time” marketing plan the highest average net income came from revenue or yield
insurance at the lowest coverage level and incorporating any of the marketing plans into
your risk management strategy decreased your risk and increased your average net
income over selling everything at harvest.
Results for Colfax irrigated acres with a hedging limit of 100% of APH (listed in
the Appendix) did not change dramatically from empirical results. The “Time”
marketing plan still returned least risk and highest average net income however the
highest average net income within the “Time” marketing plan was under yield insurance
at the 60% coverage level, an increase in coverage from the empirical results.
Non-irrigated corn results in Scotts Bluff with hedging up to 100% of APH (listed
in the Appendix) did not change much. The “Time” marketing plan still resulted in the
highest average net income however, including the out-of-sample year made revenue
insurance at the 55% coverage level return the highest average net income and the least
risk was still seen with yield insurance at the highest coverage level. All four marketing
plans that utilized moving averages resulted in the lowest risk when paired with yield
insurance at the highest coverage level similar to the empirical results. Incorporating
hedging before harvest into your risk management strategy returned higher average net
incomes and less risk in every marketing plan except for “Price Decline”. Not buying
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insurance or strategic hedging put you at the highest risk and an average net income that
was the second lowest.
Results from irrigated corn production in Scotts Bluff while hedging up to 100%
of APH (listed in the Appendix) indicate the “Time” marketing plan provides higher
levels of average net income than the “Price Incline” marketing plan unlike the empirical
results where the average net incomes generated under both marketing plans were
similar. However, all marketing plans except “Time” and “Price Incline” resulted in
greater risk than doing no hedging before harvest under multiple crop insurance
contracts. The “Price Incline” marketing plan resulted in similar levels of risk with
higher average net income than doing no hedging before harvest with and without
insurance. Results from the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot when hedging up to 100% of
APH (listed in the Appendix) changed from the empirical model. The “Time” marketing
plan provides the least risk and higher average net income than the “Price Incline”
marketing plan under all insurance contracts. Including the out-of-sample year changed
the insurance contract returning the highest average net income to a slightly higher
coverage level of revenue insurance. Yield insurance at the lowest coverage level gives
you slightly less risk but the second lowest average net income under the “Time”
marketing plan.
Net Income (Low Yield/Low Price)
Next, we see how including an out-of-sample year to the empirical model of a low
yield and low price combination to investigate if adding a rare event drastically alters the
results. Including this out-of-sample year did not dramatically alter the results for
Colfax non-irrigated corn production while hedging up to 100% of APH. Non-irrigated
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results in Colfax differed only in the insurance contract returning the highest average net
income under the “Time” marketing plan. Including the out-of-sample year changed the
risk management strategy providing you with the highest average net income and the
least risk from low coverage level of yield insurance to a low coverage level of revenue
insurance as indicated from Fig. 5.21. The two marketing plans triggered when price
moves around the 20-Day moving average both provide you with risk management
strategies with less risk than the “Price Incline” marketing plan but at lower average net
incomes. When producing non-irrigated corn in Colfax incorporating hedging before
harvest into your marketing plan resulted in less risk and higher average net incomes than
selling all your produced bushels at harvest.
“Time” and “Price Incline” both returned the highest average net incomes under
irrigated corn production in Colfax when hedging up to 100% of your APH was allowed
(available in the Appendix). “Price Incline” resulted in higher average net income but the
“Time” marketing plan provided less risk under every insurance contract. Revenue
protection at the lowest coverage level provided the highest average net income and least
risk when incorporated with the “Time” marketing plan. Utilizing a marketing plan that
sells all your produced bushels at harvest and doesn’t include insurance resulted in the
most risk and average net incomes similar to selling all of your produced bushels at
harvest while buying insurance.
Results from Scotts Bluff non-irrigated corn with hedging up to 100% of APH
(listed in the Appendix) also remained the same. The “Time” marketing plan once again
provided the least risk with yield protection at the highest coverage level and the highest
average net income with yield insurance at the lowest coverage level. Results from
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irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff with hedging up to 100% of APH (available in Appendix)
did not change from the empirical results. The “Time” marketing plan provided you with
the least risk and the “Price Incline” marketing plan resulted in slightly higher average
net income but with greater risk. The highest average net incomes under both the “Price
Incline” marketing plan and the “Time” marketing plan were still realized when
purchasing yield insurance at the lowest coverage level. Incorporating the out-of-sample
year into the Knorr-Holden irrigated corn plot with hedging up to 100% of APH (shown
in the Appendix) did not change the results dramatically. The “Time” marketing plan
still returned the highest average net income however the highest average net income
within the “Time” marketing plan was achieved when paired with slightly higher
coverage level of revenue protection. The least risk still came from purchasing yield
insurance at the lowest coverage level. Three other marketing plans, “Price Decline”, “If
Price > than the 20-Day MA” and “If Price < than the 20-Day MA” all had similar levels
of risk as the “Time” marketing plan under many insurance contracts but much lower
average net incomes.
Different Levels of Hedging (Low Yield/High Price)
Finally, we compare the results under different levels of hedging when
incorporating out-of-sample years to the results generated under the empirical model.
We begin with the high price and low yield scenario for Colfax non-irrigated corn. When
participating in low levels of hedging while producing non-irrigated corn in Colfax the
differentiating factor between financial outcomes is the insurance contract purchased.
Fig. 5.22 shows that results were clustered by the insurance contract not the marketing
plan under low levels of hedging. Purchasing yield insurance at medium (65-75%)
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coverage levels provided the highest average net income and least risk under multiple
marketing plans. At medium levels of hedging (Fig. 5.23) the marketing plans play a
bigger role in differentiating the financial outcomes similar to the results generated by the
empirical model. At medium levels of hedging the “Price Incline” marketing plan
returned the highest average net incomes but the least risk came from multiple marketing
plans when purchasing high coverage levels of yield insurance. At high levels of hedging
the results are very similar to the empirical model with the marketing plans returning the
biggest difference in minimizing your risk and maximizing your average net income.
Results from Fig. 5.24 indicate the “Time” marketing plan and “Price Incline” marketing
plan returned the highest average net incomes and the “Time” marketing plan coupled
with revenue or yield insurance at low coverage levels provided the least risk.
Results from irrigated corn production in Colfax (available in Appendix) indicate
at low levels of hedging the “Time” marketing plan provided the highest average net
income and lowest risk when paired with multiple insurance contracts. As more hedging
is incorporated into your risk management strategy these results change and the “Price
Incline” marketing plan provides the least risk option with yield insurance at the highest
coverage level and the highest average net income option with yield insurance at 65%
coverage. The results at medium levels of hedging are similar to the empirical results but
at a slightly higher coverage level of insurance. At the highest levels of hedging the
“Time” marketing plan returns the highest level of average net income and the least risk
under every insurance contract. The average net incomes achieved under the “Time”
marketing plan when including this out-of-sample year are higher than the empirical
results.
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At low levels of hedging when producing non-irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff the
out-of-sample results (available in the Appendix) did not differ dramatically from the
empirical results with the “Time” marketing plan again providing the highest average net
income and least risk. When participating in medium levels of hedging the marketing
plans perform very similar in the average net income received and risk level with the
“Time” marketing plan returning higher average net incomes and the same risk level as
the other marketing plans. At high levels of hedging the “Time” marketing plan provided
the highest average net income when low coverage levels of revenue insurance were
purchased and the least risk when paired with the highest level of yield coverage.
At low levels of hedging when producing irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff insurance
plays a bigger role than the marketing plan in maximizing your average net income and
minimizing your risk (results shown in Appendix). Yield insurance at the 80% coverage
level provided the least risk while yield insurance at 50% coverage level returned the
highest average net incomes. At medium levels of hedging the marketing plan utilized
becomes more crucial with the “Price Incline” marketing plan resulting in the highest
average net income and the “Time” marketing plan when paired with yield insurance at
the highest coverage level providing the least risk. At the highest levels of hedging the
“Time” marketing plan provided the least risk and highest average net incomes while
purchasing yield and revenue insurance at the lowest levels of coverage provided the
highest average net income.
Results from low levels of hedging at the Knorr-Holden irrigated corn plot
(available in Appendix) differed from the empirical results in the insurance contract
providing the highest average net income. Revenue protection at the 70% coverage level
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instead of the 75% seen in the empirical results returned the highest average net income
under multiple marketing plans. At medium levels of hedging the “5-Day MA Drops
Below 10-Day” marketing plan paired with yield at the highest coverage level returned
the highest average net income. Under the highest levels of hedging the “Time”
marketing plan provided the highest average net income and least risk.
Different Levels of Hedging (Low Yield/Low Price)
Finally, we test our model incorporating an out-of-sample year with a low yield
and low price under different levels of hedging. When incorporating the out-of-sample
year into our model for Colfax non-irrigated corn, at low levels of hedging (Fig. 5.25)
risk management strategies rely more on the insurance contract selected than the
marketing plan. Yield insurance at medium (65-70%) coverage levels provided the least
risk and highest average net income under low levels of hedging. At medium levels of
hedging medium coverage levels of yield insurance with the “Price Incline” marketing
plan returned the highest average net income while the highest level of yield insurance
under multiple marketing plans provided the least risk. Under high levels of hedging
(Fig. 5.27) the “Time” and “Price Incline” marketing plan both returned similar average
net incomes with the least risk provided by the “Time” marketing plan paired with low
coverage levels of yield and revenue insurance.
With irrigated corn production in Colfax (results available in Appendix) at low
levels of hedging the marketing plan incorporated played less of a role than in the
empirical results with many insurance contracts and marketing plans providing the same
risk. Yield insurance at 70% and revenue insurance at 60-65% resulted in the highest
average net income under multiple marketing plans. At medium levels of hedging the
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results were the same as the empirical results with the “Price Incline” marketing plan
providing the highest average net income when paired with revenue insurance at low
coverage levels and the least risk when paired with yield insurance at high coverage
levels. At high levels of hedging the “Time” and “Price Incline” marketing plans resulted
in similar average net incomes with the “Time” marketing plan providing you the least
risk.
Incorporating the out-of-sample year under low levels of hedging when producing
non-irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff did not change the results (available in the Appendix).
The “Time” marketing plan provided the least risk when paired with revenue insurance at
a high coverage level and highest average net income when paired with yield insurance at
a medium coverage level. When participating in medium levels of hedging the “Time”
marketing plan returned the highest average net income and similar risk as the other
marketing plans. Yield insurance at the highest coverage level provided the least risk and
revenue insurance at the 60% coverage level returned the highest average net incomes.
At high levels of hedging incorporating the “Time” marketing plan increased your
average net income when paired with low levels of revenue or yield insurance and
provided the least risk when paired with yield insurance at the highest coverage level.
When producing irrigated corn in Scotts Bluff with low levels of hedging the
“Time” marketing plan provided the highest average net income (results shown in
Appendix). Incorporating the out-of-sample year changed the results from the empirical
analysis with a larger emphasis now being placed on the marketing plan selected.
Purchasing yield insurance at the lowest coverage level provided the highest net income
but yield insurance at a high coverage level lessened your risk. At medium levels of
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hedging the “Price Incline” marketing plan returned the highest levels of average net
income while every marketing plan paired with yield insurance at the highest coverage
levels provided less risk and a much lower average net income. At the highest levels of
hedging the results do not differ from the empirical results with the “Time” marketing
plan providing the least risk and the highest average net income when paired with yield
insurance at the lowest coverage level.
Results from the Knorr-Holden irrigated plot (available in Appendix) indicate
high levels of yield insurance provide the highest average net income and least risk when
participating in low levels of hedging. As more hedging is incorporated into the risk
management strategy the “Price Incline” marketing plan paired with the highest coverage
level of yield insurance returned the highest average net income and least risk. Under
high levels of hedging the “Time” marketing plan provided the highest average net
income and the least risk.
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Figure 5.1 10-Year Average Actual Production History for Scotts Bluff Yields (Source:
NASS)
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Figure 5.2 10-Year Average Actual Production History for Colfax Yields (Source: NASS
& UNL)
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Figure 5.3 1990 and 1991 Daily December Corn Future Price Path (Source: Barchart)

Figure 5.4 1990 Price Path with Triggered Hedging Days (Price Increase Marketing Plan,
Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated)
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Figure 5.5 1991 Price Path with Triggered Marketing Days (Price Increase Marketing
Plan, Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated)

Figure 5.6 Colfax Non-Irrigated Corn Net Income 1989-2018 (Yield Insurance @ 70%
Coverage Level)
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Figure 5.7 Colfax Irrigated Corn Net Income 1989-2018 (Yield Insurance @ 70%
Coverage Level)

Figure 5.8 Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated Corn Net Income 1989-2018 (Yield Insurance @
70% Coverage Level)

55

Figure 5.9 Scotts Bluff Irrigated Corn Net Income 1989-2018 (Yield Insurance @ 70%
Coverage Level)

Figure 5.10 Knorr-Holden Irrigated Corn Net Income 1989-2018 (Yield Insurance @
70% Coverage Level)

56

Figure 5.11 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Non-Irrigated)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.12 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Irrigated)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.13 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.14 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Irrigated)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.15 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Knorr-Holden Irrigated)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.16 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Low [10% of
APH] Level of Hedging)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.17 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Medium
[50% of APH] Level of Hedging)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.18 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Non-Irrigated, High [100%
of APH] Level of Hedging)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.19 Colfax Non-Irrigated Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 at Different
Levels of Hedging
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.20 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.21 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.22 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5. 23 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.24 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.25 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.26 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5.27 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Non-Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
This study analyzed the risk verse reward payoff of different crop insurance
contract and intra-season hedging strategy combinations through the lens of the farm’s
net income. We first analyzed marketing plans and crop insurance contracts on thirty
years (1989-2018) of empirical evidence. An out-of-sample year was then incorporated
to test whether the results based on past occurrences were robust to a year more
financially devastating than we had experienced.
Results indicate that the optimal crop insurance contract and marketing plan
varied across space, time and level of hedging. We found that across space and practice
the “Time” marketing plan at high levels of hedging continuously provided the least risk
and the highest levels of net income when paired with low coverage levels of revenue and
yield protection. At medium hedging levels of hedging the “Price Incline” marketing
plan consistently provided the highest average net income and risk comparable to the
other marketing plans. From the results when participating in low levels of hedging
under both irrigated and non-irrigated corn from both counties and the Knorr-Holden plot
we found that the crop insurance contract selected plays a larger role in increasing your
average net income and decreasing your risk. The crop insurance contract providing you
the highest average net income and least risk changed based on the location and whether
you were producing irrigated or non-irrigated corn. As more hedging is incorporated into
your risk management strategy the marketing plan selected begins to differentiate the
financial outcomes. Incorporating the out-of-sample year did not significantly change the
results from the empirical analysis.
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Some limitations of this study are that while hedging opportunities before harvest
are included, we do not consider post-harvest hedging opportunities. In years with a
large market carry, producers may be able to improve returns by hedging in deferred
contract months. Incorporating post-harvest storage and hedging opportunities into your
risk management strategy could alter these results. Also, no government assistance aside
from the subsidy included in the crop insurance premium was included. Extending the
model to incorporate fully subsidized government programs could provide a beneficial
risk management analysis for producers.
This study is based on thirty years (1989-2018) of empirical evidence and one
out-of-sample year. Financially devastating events such as the flooding that took place in
Nebraska in the spring of 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic are not incorporated into the
model. Further analysis is needed on the probability of financially devastating events and
the severity of the events that could be realized. However, our model provides a
framework to analyze your optimal risk management strategy not only in the average net
income expected but also the exposed risk under each scenario.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Irrigated, Low [10% of APH]
Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 2 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Irrigated, Medium [50% of
APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 3 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Colfax Irrigated, High [100% of APH]
Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 4 Colfax Irrigated Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 at Different Levels of
Hedging
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 5 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Low [10%
of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 6 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Medium
[50% of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 7 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, High [100%
of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 8 Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 at Different
Levels of Hedging
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 9 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Low [10% of
APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 10 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Medium [50%
of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 11 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, High [100% of
APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 12 Scotts Bluff Irrigated Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 at Different
Levels of Hedging
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 13 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Low [10% of
APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 14 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Medium
[50% of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 15 Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, High [100%
of APH] Level of Hedging, Empirical)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 16 Knorr-Holden Irrigated Risk-Reward Tradeoff from 1989-2018 at Different
Levels of Hedging
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 17 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 18 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 19 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 20 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 21 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 22 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 23 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 24 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 25 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 26 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 27 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 28 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 29 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH]
Level of Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 30 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 31 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 32 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 33 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 34 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 35 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 36 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample High Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 37 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 38 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 39 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Colfax Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 40 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 41 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH]
Level of Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 42 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Non-Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 43 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 44 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 45 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Scotts Bluff Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 46 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Low [10% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 47 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, Medium [50% of APH] Level
of Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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Figure 48 Risk-Reward Tradeoff (Knorr-Holden Irrigated, High [100% of APH] Level of
Hedging, Out-of-sample Low Price)
Note: Net Incomes were generated under both revenue and yield insurance at 50%, 55%,
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Each dot within a marketing plan
corresponds to a different insurance contract. Dots indicating insurance contracts that
returned the highest or lowest risk as well as the highest or lowest average net income
within a marketing plan are highlighted.
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